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ABSTRACT 
In 2013, the New Jersey Appellate Court decided the potentially landmark case of 
Kubert v. Best, recognizing for the first time that a sender of a text may be held 
liable to an innocent third party injured in an automobile accident caused by a driver 
who was distracted by receiving the text. Other subsequent cases have both con-
firmed and limited the Kubert ruling. In this article, we explore possible further 
extensions of the Kubert ruling, anticipating that because of expanding employer 
liability for acts undertaken by their employees, the next step in the evolution of 
texting and driving law may likely hold employers liable for accidents caused by 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, the New Jersey Appellate Court decided the potentially landmark case 
of Kubert v. Best.1 Kubert addressed whether the sender of a text (a “remote texter”) 
may be liable to an injured passenger when the accident occurred because the driver 
was distracted by the text.2 
In Kubert, Kyle Best was driving a pickup truck in the southbound lane when 
he crossed the double center line and ran into the Kuberts, who were riding a mo-
torcycle in the northbound lane.3 Best’s girlfriend, Shannon Colonna, was texting 
him.4 While looking at her text, Best sideswiped the Kuberts’ motorcycle.5 The Ku-
berts sued Best and Colonna for negligence.6 The New Jersey court decided that 
Colonna, as a remote texter, could be held liable to the Kuberts for the resulting 
accident if she “knew or had special reason to know that the driver would read the 
message while driving and would thus be distracted from attending to the road and 
the operation of the vehicle.”7 However, because Colonna did not know that Kyle 
was driving, she was found not liable in this particular instance.8 Even though she 
was not held liable, the court expanded the concept of negligence in regard to a 
remote texter’s potential liability to encompass situations where the remote texter 
knows, or has special reason to know, the recipient is driving.9 Because the Kubert 
case creates a situation where a remote texter could be held liable in certain circum-
stances, we examine the possible next step of liability. Namely, we explore the risk 
to employers that they could be held liable when a remote texter acting as an agent 
is texting within the scope of their employment. 
This article proceeds as follows. Part II explores the dangers of texting and 
driving. Then, Part III examines the expansion of liability for texting and driving 
along with current legislation and cases that address texting and driving. Next, Part 
IV considers the similar expansion of liability in drunk driving law and the policy 
reasons behind that expansion. This part establishes legal and policy parallels be-
tween drinking and driving compared to texting and driving to help answer the 
question, “Under what conditions is the remote texter liable alongside the recipient 
driver?” Additionally, “When may an employer be held liable for an accident when 
an employee texts someone the employee knew or had special reason to know was 
driving?” 
Part V of the article argues that as matter of public policy, courts and legisla-
tures should make employers liable for texting by their employees. In situations 
where an employee is texting someone they know is driving, and the text subject is 
work-related, we believe employers should be held liable for any resulting accident 
and injury. Creating legal policies will stimulate employers—who have the power 
to create comprehensive employment policies—to (1) take a more expansive view 
of texting risks and (2) broaden their existing texting policies. This will thereby 
                                                          
 1. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 1219. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 1220. 
 6. Id. at 1222. 
 7. Id. at 1221. 
 8. Id. at 1229. 
 9. Id. 
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hopefully reduce the incidence of accidents caused by texting and driving. Even 
though courts have yet to consider potential employer liability, employers would be 
well served if they prepared for that now. Finally, we make recommendations re-
garding the content and enforcement of such a texting policy to reduce the risk of 
employer liability. 
II. DANGERS OF TEXTING AND DRIVING 
Texting and driving is a major issue in the United States because of the number 
of accidents resulting from the distraction it creates.10 To reduce instances of texting 
and driving, laws were created to penalize those who use cell phones while driv-
ing.11 Numerous articles have examined the risk of using cell phones while driv-
ing.12 Some writers argue the distraction caused by using a cell phone while driving 
can be as serious as drinking and driving.13 Professors David Strayer, Frank Drews, 
and Dennis Crouch found that “[w]hen driving conditions and time on task were 
controlled for, the impairments associated with using a cell phone while driving can 
be as profound as those associated with driving while drunk.”14 The June 2009 issue 
of Car and Driver reported the following results of an experiment they conducted 
to compare the dangers of texting and driving with drunk driving:15 
During the experiment, cars were rigged with a red light to alert drivers 
when to brake. The magazine tested how long it would take to hit the 
brakes when sober, when legally impaired at a [blood alcohol content] 
level of .08, when reading an e-mail and when sending a text. Sober, fo-
cused drivers took an average of 0.54 seconds to brake. For legally drunk 
drivers four feet needed to be added. An additional 36 feet was necessary 
                                                          
 10. Texting and Driving Statistics, EDGAR SNYDER & ASSOCIATES, https://www.ed-
garsnyder.com/car-accident/cause-of-accident/cell-phone/cell-phone-statistics.html (last visited Feb. 
26, 2019) (“The National Safety Council reports that cell phone use while driving leads to 1.6 million 
crashes each year. . . . Nearly 390,000 injuries occur each year from accidents caused by texting while 
driving.”). 
 11. Distracted Driving, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASSOC., https://www.ghsa.org/state-laws/is-
sues/Distracted-Driving (last visited Feb. 26, 2018) (fifteen states, the District of Columbia (“D.C”), and 
three U.S. territories prohibit all drivers from using hand-held cell phones while driving. Thirty-eight 
states and the D.C. ban cell phone use by novice drivers, while 20 states and D.C. prohibit it for school 
bus drivers. Forty-seven states, D.C., Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands ban text messaging 
for all drivers). 
 12. See, e.g., Victoria K. Lee, Fatal Distraction: Cell Phone Use While Driving, 59(7) CAN. FAM. 
PHYSICIAN 723 (2013); CDC: 10 Most Important Public Health Problems and Concerns, BECKER’S 
HOSP. REV., (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/population-health/cdc-10-most-
important-public-health-problems-and-concerns.html. 
 13. See, e.g., Phil LeBeau, Texting and Driving Worse than Drinking and Driving, CNBC, 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/31545004 (last updated Aug. 3, 2010, 11:45 AM); David L. Strayer, Frank A. 
Drews & Dennis J. Crouch, Fatal Distraction? A Comparison of the Cell-Phone Driver and the Drunk 
Driver, U. IOWA RES. ONLINE 25, 29 (2003), https://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti-
cle=1085&context=drivingassessment. 
 14. David L. Strayer, Frank A. Drews & Dennis J. Crouch, A Comparison of the Cell Phone Driver 
and the Drunk Driver, 48 HUM. FACTORS: J. HUM. FACTORS & ERGONOMICS SOC’Y 381, 390 (2006). 
 15. Michael Austin, Texting While Driving: How Dangerous is it?, CAR & DRIVER (June 24, 2009), 
https://www.caranddriver.com/features/texting-while-driving-how-dangerous-is-it. 
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for reading an e-mail, and a whopping added 70 feet was needed for send-
ing a text.16 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) has said that 
they believe that mobile phone use and driving should be on par with the use of 
alcohol and driving because it has the same effect by impacting the driver’s ability 
to focus on driving safely.17 In fact, many insurance companies are starting to treat 
cell phone tickets similarly to DWI offenses, raising insurance rates when drivers 
receive such a ticket.18 
Distracted driving caused by texting may be one of the more dangerous activi-
ties that one can engage in. For example, 
The statistics show that individuals who drive while sending or reading 
text messages are 23 times more likely to be involved in a car crash than 
other drivers. A crash typically happens within an average of three seconds 
after a driver is distracted. . . . Every year, about 421,000 people are injured 
in crashes that have involved a driver who was distracted in some way. 
Each year, over 330,000 accidents caused by texting while driving lead to 
severe injuries. This means that over 78% of all distracted drivers are dis-
tracted because they have been texting while driving. . . . Each day in the 
United States, approximately 9 people are killed and more than 1,000 in-
jured in crashes that are reported to involve a distracted driver. Distracted 
driving is driving while doing another activity that takes your attention 
away from driving.19 
Because of the increasing evidence of the public health and economic concerns 
of texting while driving, there are increasing calls for stronger action to eliminate 
the behavior. For example, Christopher Edwards, J.D. candidate from the Univer-
sity of Akron School of Law, stated the following: 
                                                          
 16. Kiernan Hopkins, Is Texting While Driving More Dangerous Than Drunk Driving?, DISTRACTED 
DRIVER ACCIDENTS.COM (Apr. 2, 2013), http://distracteddriveraccidents.com/texting-driving-danger-
ous-drunk-driving; see also Austin, supra note 15; Strayer, Drews & Crouch, supra note 14 (concluding 
In fact, when controlling for driving difficulty and time on task, cell phone drivers may actually exhibit 
greater impairments (i.e., more accidents and less responsive driving behavior) than legally intoxicated 
drivers. These data also call into question driving regulations that prohibit hand-held cell phones and 
permit hands-free cell phones, because no significant differences were found in the impairments to driv-
ing caused by these two modes of cellular communication.). 
 17. Steve Bowen, Using Cell Phones While Driving is as Bad as Drunk Driving, QUOTEWIZARD, 
https://quotewizard.com/auto-insurance/cell-phones-like-driving-drunk-for-motorists (last updated Feb. 
12, 2018). 
 18. Nelson, Fromer, Crocco & Jordan - New Jersey Lawyers, FACEBOOK (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.facebook.com/pg/Nelson-Fromer-Crocco-and-Jordan-New-Jersey-Lawyers-
301478609873127/posts 
(Put the cell phone down! I was advised recently, by a prior client, that although her cell 
phone ticket from an Ocean County Municipal Court cost a little less than $250, the insurance 
company hit her with a $1000 surcharge! . . . The insurance industry took its cue from the 
NHTSA and is now looking at cell phone tickets as being the same as a DWI when it comes 
to raising your rates.). 
 19. Distracted Driving Facts, END DISTRACTED DRIVING, https://www.enddd.org/the-facts-about-
distracted-driving (last visited Feb. 17, 2019). 
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Empirical evidence of the negative consequences caused by distracted 
driving—and specifically texting and driving—should serve as incentive 
for society to address the issue and take steps to curtail the unsafe activity. 
In the United States, approximately 899,000 automobile accidents were 
related to distracted driving in 2010, and at least 47,000 police-reported 
crashes involved a driver who was distracted by an electronic device. Since 
then, various studies have concluded that the activity of texting while driv-
ing is one of the most risky forms of distracted driving. Furthermore, the 
economic costs imposed on society by accidents caused by distracted driv-
ing should further incentivize society to proactively reduce distracted driv-
ing. Specifically, a study by the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration reported that the economic cost of distracted driving equated to a 
total cost of at least $40 billion. This figure includes ‘losses [of] produc-
tivity, medical costs, legal and court costs, emergency service costs, insur-
ance administration costs, congestion costs, property damage, and work-
place losses.’20 
The problem of texting and driving seems to be getting worse, especially 
among millennials. 
A new report from the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety found that 
88[%] of young millennials engaged in at least one risky behavior behind 
the wheel in the past 30 days, earning the top spot of worst behaved U.S. 
drivers. These dangerous behaviors—which increase crash risk—included 
texting while driving, red-light running and speeding. These findings come 
as U.S. traffic deaths rose to 35,092 in 2015, an increase of more than 
7[%], the largest single-year increase in five decades. . . . ‘Alarmingly, 
some of the drivers ages 19-24 believe that their dangerous driving behav-
ior is acceptable,’ said Dr. David Yang, AAA Foundation for Traffic 
Safety executive director. ‘It’s critical that these drivers understand the po-
tentially deadly consequences of engaging in these types of behaviors and 
that they change their behavior and attitudes in order to reverse the grow-
ing number of fatalities on U.S. roads.’21 
Thus, it appears that texting while driving is at least as dangerous as drunk 
driving, and possibly more so. Because of the dangers involved in texting and driv-
ing, we assert that the law needs to respond to the effects of this technology. Pro-
fessor David Friedman agrees with our assertion by stating the following: 
Technological change affects the law in at least three ways: (1) by altering 
the cost of violating and enforcing existing legal rules; (2) by altering the 
underlying facts that justify legal rules; and (3) by changing the underlying 
facts implicitly assumed by the law, making existing legal concepts and 
                                                          
 20. Christopher P. Edwards, The Next Best Defendant: Examining A Remote Text Sender’s Liability 
Under Kubert v. Best, 50 AKRON L. REV. 353, 356–57 (2016) (internal citations omitted). 
 21. Jessica Souto, Young Millennials Top List of Worst Behaved Drivers, AM. AUTO. ASSOC. 
NEWSROOM (Feb. 15, 2017), http://newsroom.aaa.com/tag/texting-while-driving; see also Daniel Bean, 
Drivers Know Cellphone Use Dangerous, but Drive and Phone Anyway, ABC NEWS (Apr. 6, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/drivers-cell-dangerous-drive/story?id=18890675. 
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categories obsolete, even meaningless. The legal system can choose to ig-
nore such changes. Alternatively, it may selectively alter its rules legisla-
tively or via judicial interpretation.22 
Clearly, text messaging has adversely affected driving safety. As Professor 
Friedman says, the needed change to the law could come through legislation and/or 
judicial interpretation. We argue that such change is necessary to address new dan-
gers created by emerging technology. Our call echoes the following words of Judge 
Cardozo: 
The law does not lead us to so inconsequent a conclusion. Precedents 
drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions of 
travel [today]. The principle that the danger must be imminent does not 
change, but the things subject to the principle do change. They are what-
ever the needs of life in a developing civilization require them to be.23 
III. EXPANSION OF LIABILITY FOR TEXTING 
Jurisprudence is guided by legal principles, including the principle of negli-
gence, that help determine how cases will be decided. The purpose underlying the 
principle of negligence is simple: make everyone responsible to look out for the 
well-being of others.24 A person has a duty to use reasonable care when interacting 
with others, and everyone with whom that person interacts has a right to expect that 
reasonable care will be used; if not, that they will be compensated for any resulting 
harm.25 Therefore, if a person does not behave in a reasonable manner, and their 
actions could reasonably be anticipated to injure another, then that person could be 
liable for injury resulting from those actions.26 
The elements necessary to set forth a cognizable claim for negligence are 
[(1)] duty, [(2)] general standard of care, [(3)] specific standard of care, 
[(4)] cause in fact, [(5)] legal or proximate cause, and [(6)] damage. The 
element with which we are concerned here, that of ‘duty,’ has been defined 
as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to con-
form to a particular standard of conduct towards another. Whether the law 
will impose such an obligation depends upon the relationship between the 
actor and the injured person. 
Actionable negligence presupposes the existence of a legal relationship 
between parties by which the injured party is owed a duty by the other, and 
such duty must be imposed by law. The duty may arise specifically by 
mandate of statute, or it may arise generally by operation of law under 
application of the basic rule of the common law, which imposes on every                                                           
 22. David D. Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 71 (2001). 
 23. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 391 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1916). 
 24. See A Brief Overview of Tort Law, TORT.LAWS.COM, https://tort.laws.com/tort-law (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2019). 
 25. See generally David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. Rev. 1671, 1671 
(2007). 
 26. Id. at 1678. 
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person engaged in the prosecution of any undertaking an obligation to use 
due care, or to so govern his actions as not to unreasonably endanger the 
person or property of others. This rule of the common law arises out of the 
concept that every person is under the general duty to so act, or to use that 
which he controls, as not to injure another. Further, the duty of care at issue 
may be specific, owed by the defendant to a particular plaintiff, or it may 
be of a general nature owed by the defendant to the public as a whole.27 
Prior case law has already established a duty for a passenger not to distract a 
driver, and when a passenger does distract a driver to the point of causing an acci-
dent, that passenger may also be liable for resulting damages.28 Therefore, negli-
gence law already assesses liability for someone who distracts a driver when that 
distraction results in an accident.29 
Because of cell phone technology and text messaging, someone can now dis-
tract a driver even though they are not physically present in the car. In Kubert, the 
trial court ruled that a driver could be distracted by someone not in the presence of 
the driver.30 The Kubert case stands for the proposition that if a remote texter mes-
sages someone they know or have special reason to know is driving, and they know 
that the driver will likely be distracted by the message, then the texter should rea-
sonably foresee that texting may cause that driver to look at the text which could 
cause an accident.31 Whether a duty exists to refrain from texting a person you know 
is driving requires, like any other claim of negligence, 
an examination of the reasonableness of the risk created by the defendant’s 
conduct. This in turn depends upon a panorama of considerations such as 
the magnitude of the harm, the likelihood and foreseeability of its occur-
rence, weighed against the utility of the defendant’s conduct.32 
The magnitude of the harm caused by texting and driving is substantial, the 
foreseeability of an accident is high, and the necessity of texting at that moment is 
generally low. Texting can normally wait until it is safe to do so.33 
                                                          
 27. Hetterle v. Chido, 400 N.W.2d 324, 326–27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). 
 28. Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly held that a passenger may be held liable to an injured 
third party if she interferes with the driver’s control of the automobile through her own affirmative neg-
ligence. See, e.g., Olson v. Ische, 343 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Minn. 1984) (“A passenger who interferes with 
his driver’s operation of the motor vehicle, for instance by grabbing the steering wheel, may be liable to 
others.”); For examples of conduct by a passenger being found liable for damages for distracting a driver, 
see Edwards, supra note 20, at 359–60. See also Collins v. McGinley, 558 N.Y.S.2d 979 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1990); Good v. MacDonell, 564 N.Y.S.2d 949, 953 (N.Y. Motion Term 1990). 
 29. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1226 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (“We have recognized that 
a passenger who distracts a driver can be held liable for the passenger’s own negligence in causing an 
accident. In other words, a passenger in a motor vehicle has a duty not to interfere with the driver’s 
operations.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 30. Id. at 1229. Shekida A. Smith, Texting While Driving Liability Now Extends to Remote Texters, 
According To New Jersey Appellate Court, U. MIAMI L. REV. (Sept. 28, 2013), https://lawreview.law.mi-
ami.edu/texting-driving/ (“In theory, the New Jersey opinion demonstrates that legal ramifications for 
being a knowing and active nuisance to a driver who might possibly end up in a serious or fatal crash 
are not obsolete when the nuisance is ‘electronically present,’ rather than physically present, in the 
driver’s car.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227. 
 32. Hetterle, 400 N.W.2d at 326–27. 
 33. See Bowen, supra note 17. 
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Kubert has spawned several articles and blogs by practicing attorneys and oth-
ers that address remote texter liability, which conclude that the probability of mak-
ing remote texters liable for a resulting accident is likely to increase. For example, 
in a short summary of the Kubert decision, a posting from the Atkins Law Office 
noted the following: 
While the court (in Kubert) ruled that holding remote texters liable for auto 
accidents in Chicago and throughout Illinois may be possible, they’ve also 
set a high evidentiary bar to protect remote texters from being sued. . . . 
Given the increasing use and integration of cellular technology in our na-
tion, it’s an issue that is most certainly going to come up with increasing 
frequency in the future. As such, it’s important for drivers to adhere to the 
existing prohibitions and abstain from using their cell phones and tablets 
while driving. Doing so is the only way to ensure that they, and anyone 
texting them, won’t be held liable for the injury or death of other motor-
ists.34 
IV. EXAMINING THE LEGISLATION AND CASES 
At present, there is no uniform federal law prohibiting texting and driving. 
However, as of March 2018, texting while driving has been banned in 47 states and 
the District of Columbia.35 Such legislation may be the basis for civil liability in the 
event of an accident caused by the person who is sending the text to the driver.36 
Similarly, the majority of case law regarding liability in instances of texting while 
driving focuses on the conduct of the driver and the distraction caused by texting.37 
However, recent court decisions have begun to expand liability in two directions. 
                                                          
 34. Distracted Driving and the Liability of Remote Texters, ATKINS L. OFF., https://ankinlaw.com/dis-
tracted-driving-and-the-liability-of-remote-texters (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). See also Steven M. 
Gursten, How Can You Avoid Remote Texter Liability?, MICH. AUTO L. (Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://www.michiganautolaw.com/blog/2017/11/27/remote-texter-liability; Maureen May, Can Remote 
Texters Be Held Liable for Accidents?, LEGAL EXAMINER (Oct. 8, 2015, 4:23 PM), https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20170908132804/http://baltimore.legalexaminer.com/automobile-accidents/can-remote-
texters-be-held-liable-for-accidents/ (“The only sure way to prevent distracted driving accidents caused 
by cell phones: put the phone away when you get behind the wheel.”); New Jersey Court Finds Texter 
Can Have Responsibility for Remote Accident, CLEMENTS, TAYLOR, BUTKOVICH & COHEN, LPA, CO. 
(Feb. 6, 2014), https://ctbclawyers.com/2014/02/06/new-jersey-court-finds-texter-can-have-responsibil-
ity-for-remote-accident/ (“While this is a New Jersey case, it provides potent precedence of concern for 
the devastating consequences of distracted driving in Ohio and elsewhere in the U.S.”); Texting Liability 
for Remote Senders: Will This Be a Trend?, COLLINS & COLLINS, P.C., https://www.collinsattor-
neys.com/injuryblawg/auto-accidents/texting-liability-for-remote-s/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2019) (“Tex-
ting and driving has catastrophic consequences. Distracted driving in fact leads to over 1000 deaths each 
year according to the CDC’s Distracted Driving Fact Sheet.”). See also Emily K. Strider, Don’t Text a 
Driver: Civil Liability of Remote Third-Party Texters After Kubert v. Best, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1003 (2015). 
 35. Cellphones and Texting, IIHS & HLDI (Mar. 2019), https://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/laws/cell-
phonelaws/maphandheldcellbans (“In addition, novice drivers are banned from texting in two States[,] 
Arizona and Missouri.”) (internal parenthesis omitted). 
 36. See, e.g., Billy Johnson, Laws & Liability for Texting and Driving Accidents, HG.ORG, 
https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/laws-and-liability-for-texting-and-driving-accidents-44235 (last vis-
ited Mar. 2, 2019) (“In the case of texting and driving, the liability in an accident is weighted against a 
driver who was illegally texting.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Catherine Chase, U.S. State and Federal Laws Targeting Distracted Driving, 58 ASS’N 
ADVANCEMENT AUTOMOTIVE MED. 84 (Mar. 31, 2014). 
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First, there has been a move to make employers liable when their employees’ text 
and drive in the course of their employment.38 Second, liability has been extended 
to remote texters when they know their intended recipient is driving and their texts 
result in accident and injury.39 
The first element expanding employer liability involves employees who text 
while driving, and courts now interpret such action as falling within the employee’s 
“scope of employment.”40 This is based on a basic concept behind the doctrine of 
respondeat superior: the principal has control over who is hired, and also controls 
the terms and conditions of employment that employees must follow.41 Thus, the 
employer can choose whether or not to create work-related policies that promote 
safety for employees and others.42 
The other concept undergirding the doctrine of respondeat superior is “the 
principal must bear the consequences of hiring an agent to the extent it is foreseea-
ble that harm might result from the agent’s unauthorized acts.”43 This does not im-
ply that the employer is not liable for all wrongful acts by employees, because the 
doctrine of respondeat superior applies only to negligent acts by employees that are 
                                                          
 38. See, e.g., EMPLOYER LIABILITY AND THE CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE CELL PHONE POLICIES, 
NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL 8 (May 2015), https://www.nsc.org/Portals/0/Documents/DistractedDriving-
Documents/NSC-CorpLiability-WP-lr-(1).pdf [hereinafter NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL] 
(The legal theory of respondeat superior, or vicarious responsibility, means that an employer 
may be held legally accountable for negligent employee actions if the employee was acting 
within the scope of his or her employment at the time of a crash. The key phrase “acting 
within the scope of his or her employment” can and has been defined broadly in cases of 
crashes involving cell phones.). 
See also Rhonda Smith, Employer Liability Varies When Workers Using Cell Phones Cause Vehicle 
Crashes, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 18, 2012), https://www.bna.com/employer-liability-varies-
n12884910098 (“Really, the only time an employer cannot be held liable is if the employee has a crash 
and it’s not on company business and does not involve a company phone, David Teater, NSC’s senior 
director of transportation initiatives, told BNA.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 39. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1221 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013); Gallatin v Gargiulo, No. 
10401 of 2015, C.A., 2016 WL 8715650, at *4 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Mar. 10, 2016); Smith, supra note 30. 
 40. Lisa Nagele-Piazza, Employers Can Be Liable for Distracted Driving, SHRM (Oct. 29, 2018), 
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/state-and-local-updates/pages/employ-
ers-can-be-liable-for-distracted-driving.aspx (“Employers can generally be held responsible for damages 
when a distracted driver is acting in the course and scope of employment. Since technology is expanding 
and the remote workforce is growing, workers are conducting more business away from the worksite 
and on the road, which increases the chances for employer liability.”). See, e.g., Ellender v. Neff Rental, 
Inc., 965 So. 2d 898, 902 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (holding a call on an employer provider phone while 
driving to lunch was within the scope of employment); 
Jeewarat v. Warner Bros. Ent., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); Rosell v. Cent. W. Motor 
Stages, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002); Hunter v. Modern Cont’l Constr. Co., 652 S.E.2d 583, 
584 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); David Needle, Could Texting in Car Be an Employer Liability?, ENTERPRISE 
MOBILE TODAY (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.enterprisemobiletoday.com/article.php/3860556/Could-
Texting-in-Car-Be-an-Employer-Liability.htm. 
 41. Respondent Superior, FREE DICTIONARY, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/re-
spondeat+superior (last visited Mar. 3, 2019) (“An employee is an agent for her employer to the extent 
that the employee is authorized to act for the employer and is partially entrusted with the employer’s 
business. The employer controls, or has a right to control, the time, place, and method of doing work.”). 
 42. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (stating that “[t]o be within the scope 
of employment, conduct must be of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the con-
duct authorized,” and it includes a list of factors to be used in determining whether conduct is sufficiently 
similar to authorized conduct to be within the scope of employment). 
 43. Paula J. Dalley, A Theory of Agency Law, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 495, 498 (2011). 
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done within the scope of their employment.44 What is unique about this legal doc-
trine is that it places liability on the employer, even though that employer may not 
have been directly at fault.45 With this doctrine, “The important underlying societal 
policies are satisfied most of the time: the master cannot be permitted to evade lia-
bility by employing another, and the master cannot be permitted to shift the costs 
of her business to relatively innocent bystanders.”46 However, the principle of scope 
of employment 
is intended to ensure that employers internalize the losses that arise from 
their businesses. Once a loss is too far removed from the business, then it 
is no longer appropriate that the employer internalize the loss. The scope 
of employment doctrine is the legal link between the tort and the em-
ployer’s business. If the doctrine is too narrow, employers are able to ex-
ternalize some of their costs of doing business to innocent third parties. If 
the doctrine is too broad, a third party’s losses are fortuitously charged to 
an innocent business. If the doctrine is indeterminate, however, judges are 
free to decide the cases as they please. . . .47 
Because the principle limits employer liability to employee actions occurring 
within the scope of employment, it is critical to understand how “the scope of em-
ployment” is changing as a result of the use of new technology. Briefly, what fell 
within the scope of employment was formerly limited to action taken at the em-
ployer’s location, and/or during business hours.48 However, because of advance-
ments in technology, the line between “work” and “not work” has blurred.49 For 
that reason, we will examine recent expansions to what conduct of what it means to 
be within the scope of employment. 
In our case, the key question of whether employer liability attaches to employee 
cell phone use is whether that use falls within the scope of employment. To answer 
this question, we examine how the courts have recently defined work-related                                                           
 44. FREE DICTIONARY, supra note 41 (“When an employee substantially departs from the work rou-
tine by engaging in a frolic—an activity solely for the employee’s benefit—the employee is not acting 
within the scope of her employment.”). 
 45. Paula Dalley, Destroying the Scope of Employment, 55 WASHBURN L. J. 637, 640 (2016) (re-
spondeat superior “imposes liability on a person (the employer) in the absence of the person’s fault and 
often in cases where the person could not possibly have prevented the tort.”); Vicarious Liability/Re-
spondeat Superior, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/injury/negligence-theory/vicarious-liability-re-
spondeat-superior/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2019) (“What distinguishes vicarious liability (respondeat supe-
rior) from other theories of liability is that it can be imposed irrespective of participation in the wrongful 
act.”). 
 46. Dalley, supra note 45, at 642. 
 47. Id. at 637–38. 
 48. Jordan Michael, Liability for Accidents from Use and Abuse of Cell Phones: When Are Employers 
and Cell Phone Manufacturers Liable?, 79 N.D. L. REV. 299, 304–05 (2003) 
(Although an employer is not generally liable for accidents occurring before or after business 
hours, if the employee is conducting business via a cell phone at the time of the accident, the 
employer might still be indirectly liable. The employer might still be liable because conduct-
ing business via a cell phone provides a benefit to the employer). 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (defining the scope of employment 
“when performing work assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct subject to the 
employer’s control.” Therefore, with technology allowing one to “perform work assigned by the em-
ployer” from virtually anywhere and anytime, the scope of employment is not limited to the workplace 
of the employer, but to anywhere the employee is engaging in work related to his/her job). 
 49. Michael, supra note 48. 
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activities.50 The National Safety Council report stated that, “The key phrase ‘acting 
within the scope of his or her employment’ can and has been defined broadly in 
cases of crashes involving cell phones.”51 
Numerous courts have already decided that an employer is liable in cases where 
an employee who is driving and using their cell phone for their employer’s business 
has an accident.52 
For example, the State of Hawaii paid $1.5 million to the family of a man 
who was struck crossing a highway by a car driven by a state employee 
who was talking on a cell phone. In another example, Dyke Industries, an 
Arkansas lumber wholesaler, paid $16.2 million to a 79-year-old woman 
following a car accident involving one of Dyke’s salesmen who was alleg-
edly talking on a cell phone seconds before the accident occurred. In an-
other case, Jane Wagner, an attorney, struck and killed a 15-year-old girl 
with her Mercedes while talking on a cell phone late at night. The girl’s 
parents brought suit against Wagner and won a $2 million judgment 
against Wagner and her former employer, Cooley Godward, claiming 
Wagner was on a business call at the time of the accident.53 
The Wagner suit alleged that the firm was partly liable for the accident because 
Wagner’s job involved amassing billable hours by cell phone.54 Such calls, the suit 
said, were done with the expectation and acquiescence of Cooley Godward and 
served as a direct benefit to the law firm.55 “The firm and Wagner den[ied] that she 
was on a business call noting that the call occurred after business hours.”56 How-
ever, the law firm settled the claim with the parents.57 Such suits have spurred some 
companies to prohibit employees from using cell phones while driving.58 
Each of the above cases involve the employee using a cell phone for work-
related situations. However, even the definition of “workplace” is no longer clear 
and may extend beyond situations where an employee is texting and driving.59 It 
certainly no longer encompasses just the employer’s physical place of business.60 
A 2008 case stated the following: 
                                                          
 50. Id.; Miller v. Am. Greetings Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 776, 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 
(Using one’s car as a mobile office from which one places and receives work-related calls 
and conducts an employer’s business is a relatively recent, and growing, business practice. 
As that practice spreads, the doctrine of respondeat superior must necessarily evolve if it is 
to continue to fulfill its purpose of ensuring businesses bear the costs of risks that may fairly 
be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to their activities.) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 51. NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note 38, at 2. 
 52. Michael, supra note 48, at 304. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Karin Brulliard, Family Wins $2 Million in Hit-Run, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2004), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16109-2004Oct7.html. 
 55. Michael, supra note 48, at 304. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Brulliard, supra note 54. 
 58. Fredrick Kunkle, Cargill goes Cold Turkey on Using Mobile Phones While Driving, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/tripping/wp/2017/01/10/cargill-goes-
cold-turkey-on-using-mobile-phones-while-driving. 
 59. NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note 38, at 2; Smith, supra note 30. 
 60. NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note 38, at 2. 
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[t]he law of respondeat superior is not so cut and dried. . . . Using one’s 
car as a mobile office from which one places and receives work-related 
calls and conducts an employer’s business is a relatively recent, and grow-
ing, business practice. As that practice spreads, the doctrine of respondeat 
superior must necessarily evolve if it is to continue to fulfill its purpose of 
ensuring businesses bear the costs of risks that ‘may fairly be regarded as 
typical of or broadly incidental’ to their activities . . . the law involving 
‘mobile’ offices inside an employee’s car is unsettled, appellants could 
have reasonably entertained a good faith (albeit ultimately mistaken) belief 
that they could prevail here under respondeat superior.61 
Not only has the law of respondeat superior not caught up with this emerging 
business practice, but some employers and their employees are still confused about 
the role of a mobile office in the workplace. 
In Pennsylvania, a stockbroker named Robert Tarone killed a twenty-four-
year-old motorcyclist. Tarone was driving and talking on his cell phone 
while en route to a nonbusiness event. The company did not provide em-
ployees with cell phones. Tarone stated he was making ‘cold calls’ when 
the accident occurred. Other employees testified that making ‘cold calls’ 
on personal time was needed in order to contact hard-to-reach individuals. 
Although the plaintiff claimed that Tarone was acting within the scope of 
employment at the time of the accident, the plaintiff also claimed that the 
company was negligent in encouraging employees to use cell phones with-
out any warning or training on potential hazards. The company decided to 
settle the case for $500,000, which avoided the possibility of a much larger 
jury award.62 
Another relevant case, Tiburzi v. Holmes, involved Jeffrey Knight, who was a 
driver for Holmes Transport & Logistics, and Mark Tiburzi, who was driving his 
personal vehicle at the time.63 Knight caused an accident that injured 15 people and 
killed three in St. Louis, Missouri.64 One of those injured was Tiburzi, who suffered 
a severe traumatic brain injury.65 The accident was attributed to excessive speed, 
driving over the allotted on-duty hours, and distraction resulting from Knight look-
ing at his cell phone rather than the roadway.66 The jury awarded Tiburzi $18 mil-
lion, ultimately paid by Knight’s employer.67 
Just as the court in Miller expanded applicability where an employee does one’s 
work within scope of employment to the “mobile office,” these courts have recently 
extended this reasoning to include cases where the employee’s use of a cell phone 
for business purposes, from whatever location, falls within the scope of                                                           
 61. Miller v. Am. Greetings Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 776, 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Isaac A. Hof, 
Wake-Up Call: Eliminating the Major Roadblock That Cell Phone Driving Creates for Employer Lia-
bility, 84 TEMPLE L. REV. 701, 719 (2012). 
 62. Michael, supra note 48, at 305–06. 
 63. Tiburzi v. Holmes Transport, Inc., No. 4:08 CV 1151 DDN, 2009 WL 2592732, at *1 (Mo. Ct. 
App. Aug. 20, 2009). 
 64. Id. at *2. 
 65. Id. at *3. 
 66. Id. at *2. 
 67. Id. at *5 n.6. 
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employment. These cases show that in order for the doctrine of respondeat superior 
to fulfill its function, it must necessarily evolve to expand along with modern defi-
nitions and implementations of the workplace. 
A. Liability of Remote Texters 
Considering several recent cases, we now examine the propensity of courts to 
increase the liability of remote texters. Our analysis begins with Kubert v. Best.68 
On September 21, 2009, David and Linda Kubert were riding their motorcycle in 
Mine Hill Township, New Jersey.69 As the Kuberts were rounding a bend, the pick-
up truck driven by Kyle Best crossed the double center line.70 As a result, the truck 
and motorcycle collided.71 David’s left leg was nearly severed and Linda’s left leg 
was shattered.72 Best, a volunteer fireman, tried to aid the Kuberts until medical 
responders arrived, but both Kuberts lost their left legs as a result of the accident.73 
The evidence of Best’s cell phone activity on the day of the accident showed 
62 texts between him and his 17-year-old friend, Shannon Colonna.74 Colonna 
texted Best at 5:48:14 p.m., Best responded at 5:48:23 p.m. and 5:48:58 p.m., then 
Colonna texted back at 5:49:07 p.m., just before Best placed the 911 call at 5:49:15 
p.m.75 Seventeen seconds passed between Best texting Colonna and the 911 call.76 
In that brief period, Best must have stopped and exited his truck, realized the gravity 
of the Kuberts’ injuries, and called 911. The judge inferred that Colonna’s texting 
distracted Best, causing him to collide with the Kuberts’ motorcycle.77 
The Kuberts sued both Best and Colonna for compensation, alleging the acci-
dent was caused by distractions created by their texting.78 Best settled, and the trial 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Colonna on the ground that she had no 
legal duty to avoid texting Best, even if she knew he was driving.79 
On appeal, the Kuberts challenged the summary judgment in favor of Colonna, 
urging that if a jury found her texting to be a proximate cause of the accident, then 
she should be liable for aiding and abetting Best’s unlawful texting while driving.80 
The Kuberts also claimed that Colonna “had an independent duty to avoid texting 
to a person who [she knew] was driving” and that, based on the timestamps of the 
texts, a jury could infer that Colonna knew Best was driving home from work when 
she texted him less than a minute before the accident.81 
The appellate court agreed that Colonna did have a legal duty to not distract 
Best while he was driving, declaring that “a person sending text messages has a 
duty not to text someone who is driving if the texter knows, or has special reason to 
                                                          
 68. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
 69. Id. at 1219. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1220. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1220–21. 
 78. Id. at 1218. 
 79. Id. at 1221–22. 
 80. Id. at 1221; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-97.3 (West 2014) (making texting and driving illegal). 
 81. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1221. 
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know, the recipient will view the text while driving.”82 However, the Kuberts were 
unable to produce sufficient evidence to prove that Colonna knew or had special 
reason to know that Best was driving during their text conversation; therefore, the 
appellate court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Colonna.83 Thus, even 
though the summary judgment in favor of Colona was upheld, the case created an 
expansion of duty under the tort of negligence. 
A subsequent 2016 Pennsylvania case, Gallatin v. Gariulo, cited Kubert and 
adopted that same expansion of what is included as a duty in a negligence case, 
namely that a remote texter who is texting someone they know is driving could also 
be liable for a resulting accident.84 In Gallatin, Laura Gargiulo was operating a ve-
hicle owned by Joseph Gargiulo.85 Laura was driving behind Daniel Gallatin, who 
was riding a motorcycle.86 Laura was responding to a text message from Joseph, 
who knew she was driving.87 Laura was distracted while receiving Joseph’s text, 
and caused the accident that killed Daniel Gallatin.88 The estate of Gallatin sued 
both Laura and Joseph: Laura for negligence and Joseph, as the remote texter, for 
negligently distracting her.89 In addition, the estate sued Timothy Fend, who was 
also texting Laura when she was driving, claiming that he should also be held liable 
as a remote texter.90 Both Laura and Fend filed a preliminary objection claiming 
that there was no legal basis in Pennsylvania for the claim that they were negli-
gent.91 In deciding whether the court should dismiss the case against Fend, the court 
said the following: 
The Court is unaware of Pennsylvania precedent specifically regarding the 
duties or liability of the sender of a text message to a person who is simul-
taneously operating a motor vehicle. However, the Superior Court of New 
Jersey, in the case of Kubert v. Best, addressed this very issue. In Kubert, 
the Court held that as a matter of civil common law, the sender of a text 
message can potentially be liable if an accident is caused by texting, but 
only if the sender knew or had special reason to know that the recipient 
would view the text while driving and thus be distracted.92 
The Court then adopted the Kubert rule and said “Defendant Fend may not 
have in fact known or should have known that Defendant Laura E. Gargiulo was 
operating a motor vehicle at the time of the text message.”93 However, at this pre-
liminary objection stage there was no evidence as to whether he knew or should 
have known.94 The court then overruled his preliminary objection saying, “Fend 
should remain a party in this case at this time, and Plaintiff may explore through 
                                                          
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1222, 1229. 
 84. Gallatin v. Gargiulo, No. 10401, 2016 WL 8715650, at *4 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 10, 2016). 
 85. Id. at *1. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at *4. 
 91. Id. at *5. 
 92. Id. at *4. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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discovery whether Defendant Fend violated a duty owed to a third person.”95 The 
preliminary objections for Joseph Gargiulo were also overruled for the same rea-
sons.96 
Thus, this case clearly adopted the Kubert rule in regard to remote texters by 
stating both of these remote texters could have potential liability that could not be 
dismissed on these preliminary objections. However, The Washington Post reported 
that an order was entered in Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas to dismiss 
the case against Fend, noting Fend’s “testimony in depositions undercut a chief 
premise of the legal theory, namely that the person sending the text knew or should 
have known that the recipient was driving.”97 This decision in favor of Fend rested 
on the fact that in his deposition there was no evidence that he knew, or had special 
reason to know, Laura Gargiulo was driving and, therefore, Fend could not be held 
liable under the rule created by Kubert.98 Although we do not know the ultimate 
disposition of the case against Joseph Gargiulo as a remote texter (likely due to a 
settlement), what is clear is this Pennsylvania court adopted the Kubert rule.99 
Both the Kubert and Gallatin cases focused on what constitutes “reasonable 
behavior.”100 In both cases, the judges decided it is reasonable for a texter to antic-
ipate that sending texts to the driver of a moving vehicle may precipitate an acci-
dent.101 Thus, if the texter knows the driver is driving, both the texter and the driver 
would be jointly and severally liable to parties injured in an accident. 
A 2010 case, Buchanan Ex-Rel. Buchanan v. Vowell, possibly foreshadowed 
the court’s decision in Kubert.102 In Buchanan, Candice Vowell was drinking at a 
bar and consumed enough alcohol to become intoxicated.103 Her mother, Shannon, 
who was also at the bar, said she would follow Candice home to make sure she got 
there safely and call her on her cell phone as needed.104 On her way home, Candice 
hit a pedestrian, Jerry Buchanan, and seriously and permanently injured him.105 To 
seek compensation for his injuries, Jerry sued not only Candice and the bar who 
served her, but also Shannon.106 He claimed that Shannon engaged in a negligent 
activity with Candice that was the proximate cause of his injuries.107 Jerry’s theory 
was that because Shannon gratuitously undertook a duty to control Candice’s driv-
ing, including cellular communication with Candice, and Shannon’s cellular com-
munication with Candice negligently distracted an intoxicated driver, Shannon was, 
in part, the cause of the accident.108 The trial court dismissed the complaint against 
                                                          
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at *5. 
 97. Fredrick Kunkle, Case Dismissed Against Person who Texted Driver in Fatal Pennsylvania Crash, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/tripping/wp/2018/02/03/case-dis-
missed-against-person-who-texted-driver-in-fatal-pennsylvania-crash/?utm_term=.1ac33ca63a74. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Gallatin, 2016 WL 8715650, at *4. 
 100. Id. at *5; Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
 101. Gallatin, 2016 WL 8715650, at *4. 
 102. Buchanan ex rel. Buchanan v. Vowell, 926 N.E.2d 515, 521–22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 
 103. Id. at 517. 
 104. Id. at 517–18. 
 105. Id. at 517. 
 106. Id. at 518. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 519. 
15
Reinsch et al.: Exploring the Case for Expanded Remote Texter Liability for Emplo
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
86 B.E.T.R. [Vol. 3 2019 
Shannon.109 However, the appellate court reversed and remanded, noting the fol-
lowing: 
The allegations made by Jerry in his amended complaint show that Shan-
non agreed to enter into a concerted activity whereby Shannon would fol-
low the drunken Candice and would direct and/or distract her by calling 
her on her cell phone. . . . Furthermore, we note that Shannon owed a duty 
of reasonable care to those that shared the road with her, both motorists 
and pedestrians. Shannon, as an individual, may have breached this duty 
by calling and distracting a person she knew was operating a vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol. Thus, Shannon may be found liable for 
Jerry’s injuries even if she did not gratuitously assume a duty or act in 
concert with Candice.110 
Buchanan is similar to Kubert and Gallatin because both courts ruled that a 
remote person using a cellphone to contact a driver could be liable to an injured 
third party if the cellular communication distracted the driver and caused an acci-
dent. 
Finally, there is a New York case, Vega v. Crane, in which the court refused to 
make a remote texter liable for a resulting accident.111 However, the situation differs 
from both Kubert and Gallatin. The plaintiff asked the court to extend the rule from 
Kubert and argued that the court should establish a rule that the remote texter should 
be liable, even though it was clear that the remote texter did not know that the person 
they were texting was driving.112 The court refused to do so.113 According to the 
Vega court, Kubert held “that a third party, who had knowledge that the motorist 
they were texting was driving at the time the parties were exchanging text messages, 
could be found liable for any resulting damages.”114 The Vega court also determined 
that, “[w]hile undoubtedly there are certain circumstances that would establish a 
third-party duty . . . those facts do not exist here.”115 Therefore, in Vega, the New 
York court could seemingly have accepted Kubert if the facts would have been dif-
ferent. However, it is unclear what those facts would have to be. 
As seen by the above cases, an evolution in the law has already begun through 
judicial interpretation. Initially, in Buchanan, the court extended liability to some-
one who was “remotely distracting” to the driver who caused the accident (albeit 
not texting), and then in Kubert and Gallatin, courts expanded liability to texters 
more generally. The primary differences of those texting cases to the situation in 
Buchanan is that Shannon Vowell clearly knew the person she was communicating 
with was driving. Next, we examine the issue, the “knowledge requirement,” as it 
applies in the case of remote texting. 
                                                          
 109. Id. at 516. 
 110. Id. at 521–22 (internal citations omitted). 
 111. Vega v. Crane, 55 Misc. 3d 811, 817 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017). 
 112. Id. at 813. 
 113. Id. at 822. 
 114. Id. at 814 (internal citations omitted). 
 115. Id. at 815. 
16
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 3 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 19
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol3/iss1/19
Iss. 1] Reinsch, Bell & Roline: Texting and Employer Liability 87 
B. The Knowledge Requirement 
Because it is certainly possible to be unaware of exactly what a person you are 
texting may be doing, the knowledge of the texter becomes a more difficult issue to 
prove (or to disprove) in remote texting situations. The court in Kubert altered the 
underlying facts that justify the proximate cause prong of the legal rule of negli-
gence: if you text someone you know is driving, you could be liable for a resulting 
accident because it is reasonably foreseeable that someone receiving a text might 
look at it and/or respond to it, which could cause them to have an accident.116 Gal-
latin affirmed this principle.117 
However, the potential liability for a remote texter is likely to be very nar-
row.118 The Kubert court specifically stated that the remote texter must either know, 
or have special reason to know, that the person they are texting is driving.119 That 
raises the question: What evidence is required to prove the remote texter knew or 
had special reason to know? First, “knowing” means that the remote texter actually 
knows the recipient is driving and still sends a text message. Additionally, the re-
mote texter knows or should know that the driver will view the text. 
In Kubert, for example, the court found that Colonna could not be held liable 
under this rule because she had no knowledge that Best was driving.120 Therefore, 
actual knowledge that the person is driving will create liability. This is further illus-
trated by the Gallatin case.121 In Gallatin, the court held that Joseph Gargiulo could 
be held liable as the remote texter because he knew that Laura Gargiulo was driving 
when he texted her.122 In both of these cases, the critical piece of evidence was the 
actual knowledge that the person the defendant was texting was driving. 
C. How Actual Knowledge Arises 
In the Kubert case there was no actual knowledge, while in the Gallatin case 
there was actual knowledge. The requirement of actual knowledge addresses what 
is “reasonably foreseeable” under the tort of negligence. If one has actual 
knowledge that they are texting someone who is driving, then that remote texter 
                                                          
 116. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1227 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
 117. Gallatin v. Gargiulo, No. 10401, 2016 WL 8715650, at *4 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 10, 2016). 
 118. Kubert, 75 A.3d 1214 at 1228 (internal citations omitted) 
(Our conclusion that a limited duty should be imposed on the sender is supported by the “full 
duty analysis” described by the Supreme Court—identifying, weighing, and balancing the 
relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to ex-
ercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution. When the sender knows that the 
text will reach the driver while operating a vehicle, the sender has a relationship to the public 
who use the roadways similar to that of a passenger physically present in the vehicle. As we 
have stated, a passenger must avoid distracting the driver. The remote sender of a text who 
knows the recipient is then driving must do the same.) 
(internal qutoations omitted). 
 119. Id. at 1229 (“We hold that, when a texter knows or has special reason to know that the intended 
recipient is driving and is likely to read the text message while driving, the texter has a duty to users of 
the public roads to refrain from sending the driver a text at that time.”). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Kunkle, supra note 97 (“A Pennsylvania court has dismissed a lawsuit against a man who was 
texting a driver involved in a fatal crash. The move came after testimony in the civil case failed to show 
that he knew the text’s intended recipient was driving at the time.”). 
 122. Gallatin, 2016 WL 8715650, at *5. 
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should reasonably foresee that the driver who receives that text might have an acci-
dent and the text was part of the proximate cause of that accident. Actual knowledge 
could arise in several ways. First, the remote texter is told by the person they are 
texting that they are driving. Here are two examples of how actual knowledge could 
be communicated to the remote texter: (1) a text the remote texter receives could 
say something like, “I am driving to your business right now and want to know if 
you are open?” Once that message is received, the potential remote texter has actual 
knowledge that the person is driving and they cannot respond. Essentially, if a text 
by the driver informs the other person they are driving, they now have actual 
knowledge. (2) The other situation would be that the remote texter is either follow-
ing or preceding the person they are texting. In that case the remote texter would 
actually know the other person is driving, thus proving “actual knowledge.” 
The alternative to “knowledge” in the Kubert test requires the remote texter to 
have a “special reason to know” that the person was driving.123 This is a little 
broader than “actual knowledge.” For example, assume a lawyer who practices in a 
suburban mall meets with his client and receives a text five minutes after the client 
leaves his office asking, “Did I leave my coat at your office?” Here, the lawyer 
would have special reason to know that the client is driving. His special reason 
consists of a combination of both the brief time since the conclusion of the meeting 
coupled with the lack of availability of non-vehicular transport methods. In contrast, 
Aaron Gevers, a J.D. candidate at the Rutgers University, speculates “special rea-
son” means that the recipient has a habit or predilection to look at text messages.124 
We believe his interpretation is too speculative. The rule is “know or special reason 
to know,” not “should have reasonably known.” 
Finally, one might ask how a plaintiff could establish that the recipient driver 
did in fact look at the text message just prior to the accident. That would be easily 
demonstrated by examining cell phone records of the driver to determine what hap-
pened right before the accident occurred.125 Once the cell phone records are ob-
tained, it is technologically possible to determine whether the texts have been 
read.126 
We believe that this expansion of making remote texters liable is proper juris-
prudence because the purpose underlying the principle of negligence is to encour-
age responsibility amongst those who owe duties of care.127 A person has a duty to 
use reasonable care when interacting with others, and everyone with whom that 
                                                          
 123. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1229. 
 124. Aaron Gevers, Don’t Whisper Down the Lane: Assessing New Jersey’s “Kubert” Third Party 
Texting-While-Driving Liability, RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (Dec. 27, 2013), https://rutgerspolicyjour-
nal.org/don%E2%80%99t-whisper-down-lane-assessing-new-jersey%E2%80%99s-kubert-third-party-
texting-while-driving-liability. 
 125. Dan Ketchum, How to Get Cell Phone Records, LEGAL BEAGLE, https://legalbea-
gle.com/5140492-cell-phone-records.html (last updated Dec. 4, 2018) (“[C]ases as mundane as civil di-
vorce, either party may subpoena cellphone records. Alternatively, an attorney may request them during 
the case’s discovery phase. Of course, it doesn’t have to be all that complicated – cellphone records can 
also be obtained via consent, such as a written authorization.”). 
 126. Ashleigh Macro, How to Tell if Someone has Read Your Text, TECH ADVISOR (Oct. 29, 2018), 
https://www.techadvisor.co.uk/how-to/mobile-phone/how-tell-if-someone-has-read-your-text-
3605143/; Francis Navarro, How You can Tell When Someone is Seeing Your Text Messages, 
KIMKOMANDO (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.komando.com/tips/416416/how-you-can-tell-when-some-
one-is-seeing-your-text-messages. 
 127. See A Brief Overview of Tort Law, LAWS, https://tort.laws.com/tort-law (last visited Feb. 16, 
2019). 
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person interacts has a right to expect that reasonable care will be used, and if not, 
that they will be compensated for any resulting harm. Therefore, if a person does 
not behave in a reasonable manner, and if their actions could reasonably be antici-
pated to injure another, then that person should be liable for injury resulting from 
those actions.128 
Actionable negligence presupposes the existence of a legal relationship 
between parties by which the injured party is owed a duty by the other, and 
such duty must be imposed by law. The duty may arise specifically by 
mandate of statute, or it may arise generally by operation of law under 
application of the basic rule of the common law, which imposes on every 
person engaged in the prosecution of any undertaking an obligation to use 
due care, or to so govern his actions as not to unreasonably endanger the 
person or property of others. This rule of the common law arises out of the 
concept that every person is under the general duty to so act, or to use that 
which he controls, as not to injure another. Further, the duty of care at issue 
may be specific, owed by the defendant to a particular plaintiff, or it may 
be of a general nature owed by the defendant to the public as a whole. 
Determining whether there exists a duty under a particular set of circum-
stances requires an examination of the reasonableness of the risk created 
by the defendant’s conduct. This in turn depends upon a panorama of con-
siderations such as the magnitude of the harm, the likelihood and foresee-
ability of its occurrence, weighed against the utility of the defendant’s con-
duct.129 
We believe that in the next step of the development of law in this area, courts 
should expand the extant jurisprudence and adopt a policy that makes employers 
potentially liable in certain remote texter situations. Tiburzi v. Holmes established 
that employers may be liable for accident and injury when drivers are texting in 
conjunction with their duties of employment.130 Kubert and its progeny established 
that a remote texter who texts a person they know is driving and will read and/or 
respond to the text could be liable to the person who is injured when that driver is 
distracted by the text and has an accident injuring third parties.131 Combining these 
two lines of reasoning, it is not a large leap for the courts to decide that when a 
remote texter is texting within the scope of their employment, the employer should 
be liable for any resulting accident and injury. Such a policy extension would in-
crease public awareness of the risk involved in texting a person they know is driv-
ing, and the potential liability associated with such texting behavior. As a result, 
fewer people will text drivers, reducing the risk of automobile accidents and conse-
quent injury. 
                                                          
 128. Hetterle v. Chido, 400 N.W.2d 324, 326–27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). 
 129. Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal citations omitted). 
 130. Tiburzi v. Holmes Transport, Inc., No. 4:08 CV 1151 DDN, 2009 WL 2592732, at *1 (Mo. Ct. 
App. Aug. 20, 2009). 
 131. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
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V. PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTING EMPLOYER LIABILITY 
As a matter of public policy, we advocate that courts and legislatures should 
make employers liable for texting by their employees. In situations where an em-
ployee is texting someone they know is driving, and the text subject is work-related, 
we believe employers should be held liable for any resulting accident and injury. 
There are two reasons underlying this proposed expanded employer liability. First, 
an innocent party should be compensated for their injury, and normally the em-
ployer has significantly greater resources to provide such compensation than the 
employee. Second, and the reason we focus on here, is that an employer has con-
siderable power to restrict the use of cell phones to conduct business. 
By creating potential liability for an employer, there will be a stronger incentive 
to limit the use of cellphones, resulting in increased awareness of the risks of texting 
and driving among their employees and, hopefully, lower rates of accidents caused 
by texting. For example, Morgan Gough, a law student at the University of Balti-
more, said the following: 
Liability rules do more than compensate the victims of harm for their in-
juries. ‘When the decisions of the courts become known, and defendants 
realize that they may be held liable, there is of course a strong incentive to 
prevent the occurrence of the harm.’ By educating people about both the 
hazards of their conduct and the potential liability consequences, tort law 
admonishes would-be wrongdoers, and thus induces at least some of them 
to take greater care. In this way, liability rules serve a prophylactic, as well 
as a compensatory, purpose.132 
Holding the employer liable in employment-related remote texter cases serves 
both of the above purposes. It increases the likelihood of compensation to those 
injured, and it also provides a prophylactic device by encouraging employers to 
create and enforce strict no texting-and-driving policies for employment-related 
texts. The courts have the power to expand the liability to the employer when an act 
is done within the scope of employment, because 
a duty is an obligation imposed by law requiring one party to conform to 
a particular standard of conduct toward another. The recognition or estab-
lishment of a legal duty in tort law is generally a matter for a court to de-
cide. One scholarly treatise has put the issue in quite simple, if not specific, 
terms: No better general statement can be made than that the courts will 
find a duty where, in general, reasonable persons would recognize it and 
agree that it exists. Central to the determination of whether a duty does or 
should exist is a ‘value judgment, based on an analysis of public policy, 
and notions of fairness. The fairness and public policy considerations in-
volve weighing several factors: [t]he relationship of the parties, the nature 
                                                          
 132. Morgan Gough, Comment, Judicial Messaging: Remote Texter Liability as Public Education, 44 
U. BALT. L. REV. 469, 470 (2015) (internal citations omitted). 
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of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the 
public interest in the proposed solution.133 
Therefore, the central question is whether this would be good public policy and 
fair to the employer. Summarizing the fairness argument, it seems fair to hold the 
employer liable because it makes them accept responsibility for their choices, such 
as not having a texting policy, and/or not enforcing one. By allowing their employ-
ees to text, employers have allowed others to be put at risk of injury and should be 
held responsible for their actions (or inaction).134 
To examine the fairness issue fully, one must look at (1) the relationship among 
the parties, (2) the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and (3) the public interest 
in the proposed solution. We examine each of these in turn. 
A. The Relationships Among the Parties 
There are four potential parties to consider: the employer, the employee send-
ing the text, the recipient of the text (who may or may not be driving), and any 
innocent third parties who may be injured as a result of the texting behavior. For 
now, we focus on the relationship between the employer and the texting employee. 
In our analysis, we assume that the employee is texting the recipient for a work-
related matter. Therefore, the employer potentially benefits from its employee send-
ing the text, with the nature of the benefit depending on the relationship of the text 
recipient to the employer.135 To the extent that the employer does potentially benefit 
from the employees’ conduct, therefore, it is fair to expand the circle of liability to 
include the employer. 
B. The Opportunity and Ability to Exercise Care 
While the relationship among the parties suggests it would be fair to hold the 
employer responsible, such is the case only if the opportunity and ability to exercise 
care is also present in the texting moment. The employer has control over the work-
related behavior of its employees and can create policies that reduce the risk of 
injury to others arising from the actions of their employees. Therefore, a plaintiff 
should be entitled to legal protection when the employer does not exercise respon-
sible control by developing and enforcing reasonable rules that employees should 
follow. Most employers already have policies prohibiting their employees from tex-
ting and driving, demonstrating that they have control and can create policies related 
to texting that reduce risk and potential liability.136 Expanding those extant texting 
                                                          
 133. Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 424 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2007) (internal quotations omitted) (internal 
citations omitted); Sharma v. Bazsika, No. L-0141-05, 2010 WL 4056873, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. July 16, 2010) (quoting Acuna with approval). 
 134. See Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74 
SOUTHERN CAL. L. REV. 193, 219–20 (2000) (providing a full discussion of this). 
 135. For example, if the recipient is a customer or potential customer, the text may result in more rev-
enue for the employer; if the recipient is a supplier or potential supplier, the employer may gain new or 
better or cheaper access to supplies, and so on. 
 136. Julie Ferguson, Distracted Driving & Employer Policies, ESI GROUP (Nov. 1, 2009), 
https://www.theeap.com/best-practices/distracted-driving-employer-policies (“A new survey of more 
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policies to cover situations where the employee is texting someone they know or 
have special reason to know is driving, rather than texting and driving themselves, 
may not be a huge additional burden on the employer. 
By analogy, there is already a model available for creating employer liability 
for employee actions that ultimately injure an innocent third party, namely the move 
to expand liability for drinking and driving that happened in the 1980s.137 Remote 
liability (liability imposed on someone other than the driver) in drunk driving acci-
dents is not unusual.138 Under certain circumstances, the owner of a bar, restaurant, 
tavern, or other establishment can be sued if an intoxicated patron causes a car ac-
cident. For example, in states such as Georgia, the persons who could be liable in a 
drunk driving accident include the driver, the bar or restaurant owner (the em-
ployer), the staff, a party host, or someone who loaned a car to the drunk driver.139 
All but the driver are remote persons in regard to the accident. 
In addition, a bartender or wait staff who serves alcohol to a noticeably intoxi-
cated person whom they know will soon be driving can create liability for their 
employer (the bar or restaurant) if that intoxicated person drives and injures a third 
party.140 That third party may sue the bar or restaurant and receive compensation 
for their injuries.141 This is very similar to an employee texting someone they know 
                                                          
phone usage policy in place, and roughly one-quarter of those surveyed prohibit both hand-held and 
hands-free devices while driving for some or all employees.).” 
 137. MADD History Impact of Mothers Against Drunk Driving, ELITE DRIVING SCH., https://driving-
school.net/madd-history-impact-mothers-drunk-driving (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) 
(In 1980, the year Candy Lightner founded Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). . . . In 
the 35 years since its founding, MADD has not only dramatically reduced the number of 
alcohol-related traffic deaths each year, but they have changed the way America looks at 
drinking and driving. . . . Over the years, MADD has been instrumental in getting drunk 
driving laws passed and the legal acceptable blood alcohol level reduced. By 1982, more 
stringent DUI laws were introduced in 35 states and passed by 24 states. A year later, 129 
new DUI laws had passed, and the snowball effect continued. They also got the support of 
the federal government for raising the legal drinking age to 21, and in 1983 President Reagan 
signed the Uniform Drinking Age Act into law. In 2000, after years of lobbying, President 
Clinton signed legislation that would effectively lower the legal blood alcohol level in the 
US to .08.). 
 138. See, e.g., Social Host Liability Laws and Lawsuits Over Alcohol-Related Accidents, NOLO, 
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/social-host-liability-laws-and-lawsuits-over-alcohol-related-
accidents.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) 
(Social host liability is a legal concept that some states follow, allowing a host of a party or 
other gathering to be held liable in certain situations where a guest becomes intoxicated and 
ends up causing an injury to a third party. Social host liability is similar to dram shop laws. 
The difference is that a dram shop law imposes liability only on sellers of alcoholic beverages 
(like bars, liquor stores, and restaurants) whereas social host liability can be imposed on an-
yone who provides alcoholic beverages to guests or visitors, if that guest goes on to injure 
someone while intoxicated. Most states have dram shop laws, but not all states have social 
host liability laws.) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 139. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-40(b) (1988). 
 140. Dram Shop Law States Bars Can Be Held Liable for Drunk Driving Accidents, ENJURIS, 
https://www.enjuris.com/car-accident/dram-shop-law.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) (“Liability is usu-
ally limited to cases in which the individual being served . . . was visibly drunk but still received ser-
vice.”); see also Legal Risks Bartenders Face for Overserving Alcohol, ALCOHOL.ORG (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.alcohol.org/laws/over-serving [hereinafter Risks Bartenders Face] (“Bartenders who serve 
intoxicated patrons may be at risk for legal and civil charges as a result of these actions. Many states 
have enacted legislation to allow for prosecution and civil suits of commercial establishments that serve 
alcohol to visibly intoxicated individuals.”). 
 141. Risks Bartenders Face, supra note 140. 
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is driving, in the context of a work-related matter, whose text results in the recipient 
having an accident that injures an innocent third party. By analogy, the third party 
should be able to sue and recover from the employer, because the dangers of texting 
while driving are very similar to, or possibly even more extreme, than those of drunk 
driving.142 
Some might argue that creating employer liability for their employees’ texting 
behavior should be done via statute. However, the courts routinely create common 
law through court decisions without waiting for a statute to be passed. As noted by 
Katherine O’Konski, a J.D. candidate from the University of Maryland, courts pre-
viously created common law in regards to drunk driving: 
The court (in Warr v. JMGM Group143) should have recognized that the 
tavern’s affirmative action in serving a visibly intoxicated patron was rel-
evant to assigning liability. Conceptualizing the tavern’s conduct as an ac-
tion is consistent with Maryland’s and other states’ case law, and would 
have enabled the court to find that the Dogfish Head tavern owed a duty to 
the Warrs under both the general principles of negligence and the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts Section 315.6. While this case presents a difficult 
challenge in balancing the interests of Maryland’s tavern businesses with 
the imperative to reduce drunk driving fatalities, the court should have 
considered that imposing dram shop liability would deter such destructive 
behavior while providing compensation for those injured.144 
O’Konski’s focus is on promoting a policy to reduce dangerous behavior in 
driving and making the person who had an opportunity to prevent that dangerous 
driving also responsible for the damages caused. Therefore, if a server at the bar 
knows the person they are serving is going to be driving, it is clearly foreseeable by 
the server that allowing the patron to continue drinking and/or allowing them to 
drive could very well result in an accident. 
Not only has there been legislative expansion of drunk driving laws, but there 
is also jurisprudence supporting such an extension. For example, in Jardine v. Up-
per Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted dram 
shop liability.145 In that case, while Thomas Gross was on his way home after 
                                                          
 142. See Summer Galitz, Killer Cell Phone and Complacent Companies: How Apple Fails to Cure 
Distracted Driving Fatalities, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 880, 890 (2018) (“This means that it is ‘safer’ to 
drive drunk than to text and drive.”) (citing Ben Spencer, Texting While Driving ‘Slows Reaction Times 
More Than Drink or Drugs’, DAILY MAIL, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2652015/Texting-
driving-slows-reaction-times-drink-drugs.html (last updated June 8, 2014)); Jonathan Michaels, Texting 
and Driving: Public Enemy No. 1, MLG ATT’YS L. (Dec. 6, 2016), https://mlgaplc.com/texting-and-
driving-public-enemy-no-1/ (“The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration classifies texting 
and driving as six times more dangerous than drinking and driving.”). 
 143. Warr v. JMGM Group, LLC, 70 A.3d 347 (Md. 2013). 
 144. Katherine O’Konski, Warr v. JMGM Group: Maryland Dram Shops Escape Duty to Foreseeable 
Victims of Drunk Driving, 73 MD. L. REV. 1206, 1206–07 (2014) (internal citations omitted). 
 145. Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 198 A.2d 550 (Pa. 1964). Dram Shop Laws, 
FINDLAW, https://dui.findlaw.com/dui-laws-resources/dram-shop-laws.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2019) 
(dram shop “laws are enforced through civil lawsuits, allowing DUI victims or their families to sue 
alcohol vendors or retailers for monetary damages.”); GERALD N. HILL & KATHLEEN HILL, NOLO’S 
PLAIN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 142 (Shae Irving ed., 1st ed. 2009) (“A law that makes a business that sells 
alcoholic drinks or a host who serves liquor to an obviously intoxicated person strictly liable to anyone 
injured by the drunken patron or guest.”). 
23
Reinsch et al.: Exploring the Case for Expanded Remote Texter Liability for Emplo
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
94 B.E.T.R. [Vol. 3 2019 
several hours of drinking, he struck two pedestrians.146 One of them, James Jardine, 
sued the tavern claiming it was liable because it was negligent in serving Gross, 
who was visibly intoxicated.147 The court agreed with Jardine, even though Penn-
sylvania lacked an applicable statute, saying, “The first prime requisite to de-intox-
icate one who has, because of alcohol, lost control over his reflexes, judgment and 
sense of responsibility to others, is to stop pouring alcohol into him.”148 As a result, 
the Pennsylvania court established a duty for a tavern to exercise their ability to 
reduce the risk of drunk driving in this kind of a circumstance. 
Arizona had a common law rule that did not hold taverns liable for the actions 
of their patrons, and it was challenged in Ontiveros v. Borak.149 However, the Su-
preme Court of Arizona rejected that rule and instead held that taverns could be 
liable for acts of their customers.150 In Ontiveros, Reuben Flores drank about 30 
beers at Borak’s bar.151 After Flores left the bar, he hit a pedestrian with his car, 
causing severe injury to the pedestrian.152 The court held that a tavern had a com-
mon law duty to conduct itself with reasonable care and prudence when dispensing 
alcohol.153 The court stated, “In selling liquor to an intoxicated customer, where it 
is evident that the customer may injure himself or others as a result of the intoxica-
tion, a vendor is not acting as a reasonable person would.”154 In this case, the court 
made a rule that overturned a prior rule made by the court.155 
The Supreme Court of Texas in El Chico Corp. v. Poole also adopted dram 
shop liability.156 Rene Saenz had been drinking heavily at a restaurant, left the res-
taurant, ran a red light, and killed Larry Poole.157 The court decided the circum-
stances were foreseeable and the restaurant should remain liable, saying “The risk 
and likelihood of injury from serving alcohol to an intoxicated person whom the 
licensee knows will probably drive a car is as readily foreseen as an injury resulting 
from setting loose a live rattlesnake in a shopping mall.”158 Additionally, the court 
addressed the fact that a bar/restaurant also had a duty to the general public to pre-
vent potential harm.159 Essentially, this is a policy statement balancing the interest 
of the bar’s owners against the interest of the public, and the public interest won. 
C. Public Interest 
In examining the expansion of drunk driving laws, it is important to note the 
impact of public policy seeking to reduce drunk driving. States have extended lia-
bility for injuries to third parties not only to employers, but beyond business 
                                                          
 146. Jardine, 198 A.2d at 551. 
 147. Id. at 552. 
 148. Id. at 553. 
 149. Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (Ariz. 1983). 
 150. Id. at 213. 
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organizations to include social hosts.160 These state laws vary, ranging from making 
social hosts liable for serving minors to making any social host liable, regardless of 
the age of the person they served at their event.161 Social host liability differs from 
dram shop liability; in the latter, a business is selling alcohol, whereas in the former, 
alcohol is simply given away and the social host derives no economic benefit at 
all.162 However, they could still be liable to an innocent third party when a host’s 
drunken guest has an automobile accident and injures a third party.163 This broad 
protection of innocent third parties shows how important it is, as a public policy 
consideration, to provide numerous and varied disincentives for providing alcohol 
to anyone who may subsequently be driving. 
There is evidence that dram shop liability, social host liability, and broader 
public knowledge of potential liability helped to reduce the number of alcohol-re-
lated car accidents.164 For example, a report by Mothers Against Drunk Driving 
(“MADD”) shows that filing a dram shop liability case reduced subsequent vehicle 
crashes.165 “[W]hen a dram shop liability case was filed in Texas in 1983, single 
vehicle crashes that occurred at night and resulted in injuries decreased by 6.5[%]. 
Another case was filed in 1984, and a 5.8[%] decrease was noted.”166 In addition, 
“MADD also believes that dram shop liability state laws contribute to more public-
ity in regard to over-serving; thus, managers and servers in these establishments are 
more aware of the liability.”167 
Making the public aware of negative consequences can deter undesirable ac-
tivities. “In 2001, researchers found a 5.8[%] decrease in fatal crashes from dram 
shop liability. Other studies have shown a similar deterrent effect from dram shop 
liability from 3[%] to 5[%].”168 “The U.S. Task Force on Community Preventive 
Services, based on the systematic review of 11 qualifying studies, ‘concludes on the 
basis of strong evidence that dram shop liability is effective in preventing and re-
ducing alcohol-related harms.’”169 A groundbreaking study which focuses on dram 
shop liability and social host liability found that “despite their relative unpopularity, 
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(States with social host liability laws applicable to guests of all ages: Alaska, Arkansas, Con-
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 161. Id. 
 162. Id. (“Laws imposing liability on social hosts for alcohol-related deaths and injuries vary from state 
to state, while some states have passed statutes that explicitly give immunity to social hosts.”). See gen-
erally Mary M. French, Jim L. Kaput & William R. Wildman, Social Host Liability for the Negligent 
Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 70 CORNELL L. Rev. 1058 (1985). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Kacey R. Scott, “In Heaven There Is No Beer, That’s Why We Drink It Here:” Making Kansas 
Roads Safer with Dram Shop Liability, 57 WASHBURN L. J. 543, 572–74 (2018). 
 165. Dram Shop and Social Host Liability, MADD (2012), https://www.madd.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/08/Dram_Shop_Overview.pdf. 
 166. Do Dram Shop Laws Reduce Alcohol-Related Accidents?, TURLEY L. FIRM (Apr. 23, 2015), 
https://www.wturley.com/do-dram-shop-laws-reduce-alcohol-related-accidents. 
 167. Id. 
 168. PROJECT EXTRA MILE, DRAM SHOP LIABILITY AND REDUCING ALCOHOL-RELATED HARMS (Jan. 
8, 2016), http://files.www.projectextramile.org/policy/underage-drinking-in-nebraska-the-facts/Dram_ 
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 169. Id. 
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tort laws are very effective in reducing accidents—even more than criminal sanc-
tions.”170 
To summarize, as with the development of the law with respect to drunk driv-
ing, this expanding pattern of case law and legislation establishes a rule that a person 
who knows his or her actions have a foreseeable risk of injuring the public has a 
duty to act and reduce the risk. Returning to the issue at hand of texting and driving, 
the Kubert court echoed these policy considerations, stating that once you are aware 
of a situation (the person you are texting is driving) that could cause an innocent 
third party injury, and you have the power to prevent that act (by refraining from 
further texting), and if you do not take these preventive measures, you could be 
liable to that third party. 
To incentivize further responsibility, we advocate extending this same princi-
ple to the employer. This evidence supports extending remote texter liability to em-
ployers in certain circumstances because employers benefit from the work-related 
texting activities of their employees and should be held responsible for the conse-
quences of these activities. Doing so provides a deterrent to employees texting in-
dividuals they know are driving. Dan Munley, a personal injury and trucking trial 
lawyer from Pennsylvania, said the following: 
Gallatin is the type of decision plaintiffs’ attorneys have long been waiting 
for. If you put people on notice that if they engage in that type of activity 
with another individual who they know is actually driving a vehicle they 
can be subject to some form of liability if there’s an injury. . . . I think that 
behavior will be curbed.171 
The creation of stricter laws against drunk driving, both by court decisions and 
by statute, has reduced drunk driving deaths.172 Deaths related to texting while driv-
ing are increasing.173 Therefore, we expect that similarly strict laws for texting and 
driving, including both statutory and court-imposed liability, should reduce acci-
dents and injury caused by texting and driving. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
In this article, we examined the development of law related to texting and driv-
ing. First, we showed that most jurisdictions have legislation and/or case law 
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SOC’Y (Oct. 27, 2013), https://www.bisociety.org/texting-while-driving-vs-drunk-driving-which-is-
more-dangerous. 
 173. Id. 
26
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 3 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 19
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol3/iss1/19
Iss. 1] Reinsch, Bell & Roline: Texting and Employer Liability 97 
making it illegal for drivers to text and drive. Then, we examined situations where 
employees were texting and driving within the scope of their employment and ob-
served that many employers are being held liable for resultant accident and injury 
in such cases. Next, we reviewed the developing case law regarding liability of re-
mote texters. The emerging law suggests that remote texters may be liable when 
they text a driver who they know, or have special reason to know, is driving. We 
argued that it is a short leap to combine these lines of jurisprudence, and we antici-
pate that employers may soon be held liable for employees who text a driver in the 
context of their work responsibilities who they know, or have reason to know, is 
driving. Such a shift to employer liability to reduce the risk of dangerous driving 
behavior parallels what happened earlier with drinking and driving laws. Moreover, 
we articulated that such an extension of law constitutes good public policy by draw-
ing attention to the risks of texting and driving. We hope that by extending employer 
liability, both the incidence of texting and driving, as well as ensuing accident and 
injury, will decrease over time. 
An employer may be able to reduce the risk of texting and driving, as well as 
the risk of litigation and negative judgment, by developing and enforcing an effec-
tive texting policy.174 Knowledgeable employers anticipate potential liability and 
create a prophylactic device to reduce that risk. In this case, the prophylactic would 
be a comprehensive texting policy, encompassing both employees texting and driv-
ing. The texting policy would also encompass texting others who the employee 
knows, or has special reason to know, are driving. Given both the current state of 
the law and the possible extension of liability, employers must create a texting pol-
icy that covers both cases of employees who text and drive and cases where em-
ployees text persons whom they know to be driving. 
Such policy may not preclude employer liability, but it may help to reduce any 
eventual judgment. Leslie Wolfe, an attorney with Cleveland-based Walter Haver-
field LLP, states the following: 
In today’s litigious society, a prudent employer knows that an employee’s 
risky or unauthorized conduct can, at times, expose the employer to liabil-
ity. To lessen the risk, employers should provide specific policies identi-
fying prohibited conduct for employees both in and outside the workplace. 
These policies should be regularly reviewed and discussed with all 
                                                          
 174. Hof, supra note 61, at 734 
(Effective deterrence from employee use of cell phones while driving must be coupled with 
an incentive for the employer to actually enforce its cell phone policies. A rational employer 
will not enforce a policy if mere presence of the policy, without more, satisfies the applicable 
standard of care and exempts the employer from liability. For the same reasons, however, an 
employer may be just as likely not to enforce a policy if it is held liable regardless of its 
enforcement policy. Fortunately, the Roszkowski test solves this dilemma…Conversely, a 
cell phone policy is of little value if employees were not actually reprimanded or discharged 
for violating the policy. If the employer tolerated its employees’ use of their phones while 
driving, the employer cannot then argue that such conduct was “unusual or startling” merely 
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(internal citations omitted). 
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employees, and employees should be invited to raise concerns and ques-
tions regarding what conduct will be tolerated.175 
A comprehensive employee cell phone use policy should include a traditional 
cell phone use policy, such as no texting while driving on work-related business or 
engaging in work-related communications at any time of the day, from any location. 
Such a policy may also limit or prohibit the use of cell phones at work for non-
related work activities. However, we are not specifically addressing this type of 
policy in this article, as most employers already have such a policy that is fairly 
comprehensive and covers these traditional areas.176 ExxonMobil and Shell Oil 
were among the first companies to implement total bans on cell phone use more 
than a decade ago, mandating that employees are not allowed to use cell phones 
while driving for company business, even with a hands-free device.177 “Owens 
Corning, a Toledo-based company with about 16,000 employees in 26 countries, 
implemented its own policy in 2012.”178 Many other companies followed suit.179 In 
their survey of the Fortune 500 in 2010, the National Safety Council “found that 
20% of the companies had policies that ban handheld and hands-free use.”180 Be-
cause those areas of texting are already covered by many companies, we will not 
include this in our recommendations, although companies that lack such a policy 
should develop one forthwith. Herein, we focus on developing policy to reduce re-
mote employee texter liability that, through respondeat superior, could otherwise 
be passed on to the employer. 
The employer’s texting policy must include both content and procedural ele-
ments. From a content perspective, there is a range of options. The simplest and 
broadest policy is to ban all texting by employees for employment-related matters 
at all times and from any place, period. In addition, the policy could ban all texting 
from the workplace to anyone, even if the texting is not specifically within the scope 
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of employment. This policy could be extended to an absolute ban of cell phones 
while at work, in addition to the texting and driving ban.181 Such a ban would vir-
tually eliminate the risk of employees texting from the workplace to someone who 
is driving. However, we realize that such a comprehensive ban on texting is likely 
to be met with many objections. Therefore, employers may need to consider policies 
that limit texting without outright banning it. 
Implementing a more limited policy must consider the expanding scope of em-
ployment, as a seemingly innocuous text by an employee could expose the employer 
to liability. From a conservative perspective, the employer’s policy should broadly 
interpret “scope of employment” and be more, rather than less, restrictive and lim-
iting of employees’ texting behaviors. 
Presuming that any texting is allowed by the policy, the policy should explicitly 
state that if the employee knows, or has special reason to know, that the text recip-
ient is driving, then they cannot text that person at all. Additionally, if the employee 
finds out during the texting process that the recipient is driving, they must stop im-
mediately. Immediately means that the employee cannot even text something such 
as, “I know you are driving so I have to stop texting you.” The texting must simply 
stop at that point, without further explanation. 
The policy should also contain progressive disciplinary measures for viola-
tions.182 Those disciplinary measures could include placing a note on the em-
ployee’s file, suspending the employee’s company-provided cell phone, or termi-
nation. Discipline must be severe enough that the employee will exert effort to ad-
here to the policy. 
From a procedural point of view, the policy should be documented, dissemi-
nated, and strictly enforced by the employer. The policy should be reviewed with 
and signed by the employee on a regular basis. This review could be done in a group 
session, individually as part of a job review, or at some other salient moment. The 
goal of such a procedure is both to communicate to the employee the seriousness 
with which the company takes its policy as well as to provide documentation that 
can help protect the company in the event of litigation. 
In terms of further guidance in developing and implementing a comprehensive 
texting policy, the National Safety Council developed a kit that can be downloaded 
and used as a guide and starting point.183 However, that kit does not address the 
remote texter liability issue that we covered here, so employers must expand on it 
to include the new potential liability. 
In conclusion, the liability for someone texting a driver who subsequently has 
an accident is expanding, but still unsettled. It is clearly potentially fertile ground 
for lawsuits, legal firms are aware of that possibility,184 and they will try to reach 
into the deepest pocket they can. Employers must act now in order to reduce their 
potential liability from their employees’ texting and driving related accidents. 
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